Abstract. This paper analyzes the aggregation of different abstract attack relations over a common set of arguments. Each of those attack relations can be considered as the representation of a criterion of warrant. It is well known in the field of Social Choice Theory that if some "fairness" conditions are imposed over an aggregation of preferences, it becomes impossible to yield a result. When the criteria lead to acyclic attack relations, a positive result may ensue under the same conditions, namely that if the class of winning coalitions in an aggregation process by voting is a proper prefilter an outcome will exist. This outcome may preserve some features of the competing attack relations, such as the highly desirable property of acyclicity which can be associated with the existence of a single extension of an argumentation system. The downside of this is that, in fact, the resulting attack relation must be a portion common to the "hidden dictators" in the system, that is, all the attack relations that belong to all the winning coalitions.
Introduction
Defeasible reasoning relies on the possibility of comparing conclusions in terms of their support. This support is often given by a set of arguments. Only those arguments (and consequently their conclusions) that remain undefeated in a series of comparisons are deemed warranted. While the literature contains alternative formalisms capturing this intuition [1, 2] , the groundbreaking work on Abstract Argumentation Frameworks reported in [3] presents a view according to which all the features that are not essential for the study of the attack relation in defeasible argumentation are eliminated. What remains is a system formed by a family of abstract arguments and a relation of attack among them. Several alternative semantics have been introduced, but the essential idea is that the set of arguments that survive all possible attacks of other arguments in the system constitute the so-called extensions of the system and capture its semantics.
One aspect that has received little attention in the literature 1 is the possibility of considering different relations of attack among the same arguments. In this scenario, the warrant of arguments cannot be established in an unambiguous way without first coalescing the multiple attack relation onto a single one acting over the family of arguments. Notice that this ensuing relation does not need to coincide with anyone of those defined over the arguments. On the other hand, nothing precludes this possibility.
In Economics, the process by which a single preference ordering is obtained given a class of individual preferences over the same alternatives, it is known as an aggregation of them [5] . Similarly, we can consider that each of the attack relations among arguments represents an individual criterion of warrant, since it defines which extensions should obtain. Then, the aggregation process weights up the different criteria and determines which extensions will actually appear, but instead of simply enumerating extensions, it yields an attack relation that supports them.
While there might exist many ways of doing this, a natural form is by means of pairwise voting [6] . That is, each alternative attack relation "votes" over pairs of arguments, and the winning relation over those two arguments is incorporated in the aggregate attack relation.
But such procedure has been shown to have, in certain contexts, serious shortcomings. It is widely known that it may fail to verify some required constraints over the aggregation process [7, 8] . These constraints are actually desiderata for a fair aggregation process. Social Choice Theory (SCT) has been studying them for over fifty years and it seems natural to transfer its results to the problem of aggregating attack relations. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem [9] claims that four quite natural constraints, that capture abstractly the properties of a democratic aggregation process, cannot be simultaneously satisfied. That is true for the case of reflexive and transitive preference relations over the alternatives. Once those constraints become incorporated in the framework of argumentation, we could expect something like Arrow's theorem to ensue. But attack relations and preference relations are different in many respects. This point must be emphasized, since it involves the reason why an Arrow-like result may not be a necessary outcome for argumentation systems. This fact makes our purpose non trivial.
The difference between aggregating individual preferences and attack criteria originates from their corresponding order-theoretic characterizations. While in Economics preferences are usually assumed to be weak orders (i.e., reflexive, transitive and complete relations), attack relations are free to adopt any configuration. On the other hand, preference relations are expected to have maximal elements, while this is not the case for attack relations. If A attacks B and B attacks C, it is commonly accepted that not only A does not (necessarily) attack C, but that A "defends" C, which implies that A and C can be jointly warranted. So, while a preference relation can lead to the choice of its maximal elements, and attack relation can lead to the choice of a maximal (w.r.t. ⊆) set of "defensible" arguments.
Viewed as criteria of acceptance, the choices should verify at least a minimal degree of rationality. In SCT that requirement is fulfilled by the condition that chosen options should not be transitively better than themselves, i.e. they should not be part of cycles of preference [10] . In the context of attack criteria this condition can be interpreted as that each of the arguments that will be deemed warranted under a criterion should be supported by chains of attacks that do not include themselves. A sufficient condition that ensures this is the acyclicity of the attack relations.
Once we require the acyclicity of the attack relations we look for aggregation processes that have as inputs finite numbers of acyclic attack relations and output also acyclic relations. In that case, as we will show in this paper, under the same conditions of fairness as Arrow's Theorem, we can prove the existence of an aggregate attack relation. In fact, following [7] we show that the class of winning coalitions of attack criteria constitutes an algebraic structure called a proper prefilter.
As it has been discussed in the literature on Arrow's Theorem, a prefilter indicates the existence of a collegium of attack relations. Each member of the collegium belongs to a winning coalition, while the collegium itself does not need to be one. Each collegium member, by itself, cannot determine the outcome of the aggregation process, but can instead veto the behaviors that run contrary to its prescription. The final outcome can be seen as the agreement of the representatives of the different winning coalitions. In this sense it indicates a very basic consensus among the attack relations.
In a sense this means that even in the case of "equal opportunity" aggregation procedures there will exist some fragment of the individual attack relations that will become imposed on the aggregate one. But while in social context this seems rather undesirable (in the literature the members of the collegium are called hidden dictators), in the case of argument systems is far more reassuring, since it indicates that when the attack relations are minimally rational, a consensual outcome may arise.
Aggregating Attack Relations
Dung defines an argumentation framework as a pair AF = AR; → , where AR is a set of abstract entities called 'arguments' and →⊆ AR × AR denotes an attack relation among arguments. This relation determines which sets of arguments become "defended" from attacks. Different characterizations of the notion of defense yield alternative sets called extensions of AF . These extensions are seen as the semantics of the argumentation framework, i.e. the classes of arguments that can be deemed as the outcomes of the whole process of argumentation. Dung introduces the notions of preferred, stable, complete, and grounded extensions, each corresponding to different requirements on the attack relation. Interestingly, if the attack relation is acyclic, the framework has only one extension that is grounded, preferred stable and complete (cf. [3] , theorem 30, pp. 331). The main application of argumentation frameworks is the field of defeasible reasoning. Roughly, arguments are structures that support certain conclusions (claims). The extensions include the arguments, and more importantly their conclusions, that become warranted by a reasoning process that considers the attack relation.
We consider, instead, for a given n an extended argumentation framework AF n = AR; → 1 , . . . , → n . Each → i is a particular attack relation among the arguments in AR, representing different criteria according to which arguments are evaluated one against another. Such extended frameworks may arise naturally in the context of defeasible reasoning, since there might exist more than one criterion of defeat among arguments.
The determination of preferred, complete or grounded extensions in an argumentation framework is based upon the properties of the single attack relation. There are no equivalent notions for an extended argumentation framework, except for those corresponding to an aggregate argumentation framework AF * = AR;
That is, AF * is a an argumentation framework in which its attack relation arises as a function of the attack relations of AF n . Notice that F may be applied over any extended argumentation framework with n attack relations. It embodies a method that yields a single attack relation up from n alternatives.
To postulate an aggregate relation addresses the problem of managing the diversity of criteria, by yielding a single approach. This is of course analogous to a social system, in which a unified criterion must by reached. While there exist many alternative ways to aggregate different criteria, most of them are based in some form of voting. In fact, the best known case of F is majority voting. Unlike political contests in which for each pair A, B ∈ AR a majority selects either A → B or B → A, we allow for a third alternative in which the majority votes for the absence of attacks between A and B. Formally:
For instance, if out of 100 individual relations, 34 are such that A attacks B, while 33 verify that B attacks A and the rest that there is no attack relation between A and B, majority voting would yield that A → B. That is, it only matters which alternative is verified by more individual relations than the other two.
Example 1. Consider the following framework in which AR = {A, B, C} and the arguments are:
A : "Symptoms x, y and z suggest the presence of disease d 1 , so we should apply therapy t 1 "; B : "Symptoms x, w and z suggest the presence of disease d 2 , so we should apply therapy t 2 "; C : "Symptoms x and z suggest the presence of disease d 3 , so we should apply therapy t 3 ".
Assume these are the main arguments discussed in a group of three agents (M.D.s), 1, 2 and 3, having to make a decision on which therapy should be applied to some patient. Suppose that each agent i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, proposes an attack relation → i over the arguments as follows:
, (B, C)} (agent 1 thinks that it is not convenient to make a joint application of therapies t 1 and t 2 or t 2 and t 3 ; moreover she thinks that B is more specific than C, hence B defeats C, and that, in the case at stake, symptom y is more clearly present than symptom w. Hence A defeats B), -→ 2 = {(A, C), (B, C)} (agent 2 thinks that it is not convenient to apply therapies t 1 together with t 3 or t 2 joint with t 3 ; moreover she thinks that symptoms y and w are equally present in the case at stake. Furthermore, both A and B are more specific than argument C, hence both A and B defeat C), -→ 3 = {(A, C), (C, B)} (agent 3 thinks that it is not convenient to apply t 1 together with t 3 or t 2 with t 3 ; moreover she thinks that symptom w is not clearly detectable, hence C defeats B, but A is more specific than C, hence A defeats C).
According to majority voting we obtain → over AR:
In this example, majority voting picks out one of the individual attack relations, showing that →=→ 2 .
3
On the other hand, majority voting may yield cycles of attacks up from acyclical individual relations:
Example 2. Consider the following three attack relations over the set AR = {A, B, C}:
We obtain → over AR as follows:
Thus, → yields a cycle A → C → B → A. This phenomenon is known in the literature on voting systems as the Condorcet's Paradox and it shows clearly that even the most natural aggregation procedures may have drawbacks.
Another way of aggregating attack relations is by restricting majority voting to a qualified voting aggregation function. It fixes a given class of relations as those that will have more weight in the aggregate. Then, the outcome of majority voting over a pair of arguments is imposed on the aggregate only if the fixed attack relations belong to the majority. Otherwise, in the attack relation none of the arguments attacks the other. That is, given a set U ⊂ {1, . . . , n}:
(A, B) / ∈→ (i.e., A does not attack B, nor B does attack A in →) can arise as follows: 
Arrow's Conditions on Aggregation Functions
While different schemes of aggregation of attack relations can be postulated, most of SCT, up from the seminal work of Kenneth Arrow [9] points towards a higher degree of abstraction. Instead of looking for particular functional forms, the goal is to set general constraints over aggregation processes and see if they can be jointly fulfilled. We carry out a similar exercise in the setting of extended argumentation frameworks, in order to investigate the features of aggregation processes that ensure that a few reasonable axioms are satisfied.
Social choice-theoretic analysis can be carried out in terms of an aggregation process that, up from a family of weak orders (complete, transitive and reflexive orderings), yields a weak order over the same set of alternatives. This is because both individual and social preference relations are represented as weak orders. But attack relations cannot be assimilated to preference orderings, since attacks do not verify necessarily any of the conditions that define a weak order. 4 Therefore, the difference of our setting with the usual Arrovian context is quite significant.
Let us begin with a few properties that, very much like in SCT, we would like to be verified in any aggregation function. Below, we will use the alternative notation → F instead of F (→ 1 , . . . , → n ) when no confusion could arise.
-Pareto condition. For all A, B ∈ AR if for every
For all A, B ∈ AR, and two n-tuples of attack relations,
-Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. For all A, B ∈ AR, and given two ntuples of attack relations,
There does not exist i 0 such that for all A, B ∈ AR and every
All these requirements were intended to represent the abstract features of a democratic collective decision-making system. While in our setting this does no longer apply, we still consider that an aggregation function should yield a fair representative of the whole class of attack relations. Let us see why these conditions imply the fairness of the aggregation process. 5 The Pareto condition indicates that if all the attacks relations coincide over a pair of arguments, the aggregate attack should also agree with them. That is, if all the individual attack relations agree on some arguments, this agreement should translate into the aggregate attack relation.
The positive responsiveness condition just asks that the aggregation function should yield the same outcome over a pair of arguments if some attack relation previously dissident over them, now change towards an agreement with the others. It can be better understood in terms of political elections: if a candidate won an election, she should keep winning in an alternative context in which somebody who voted against her now turns to vote for her.
The axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives just states that if there is an agreement over a pair of arguments among alternative n-tuples of attacks, this should be also be true for the aggregation function over both n-tuples. Again, some intuition from political elections may be useful. If the individual preferences over two candidates a and b remain the same when a third candidate c arises, the rank of a and b should be the same in elections with and without c. That is, the third party should be irrelevant to the other two.
Finally, the non-dictatorship condition just stipulates that no fixed entry in the n-tuples of attacks should become the outcome in every possible instance. That is, there is no 'dictator' among the individual attack relations. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 1
Both the majority and the qualified voting (with |U | ≥ 2) aggregation functions verify trivially the four axioms.
PROOF

Majority voting:
- 
-(Positive responsiveness): if for all A, B ∈ AR, and two n-tuples of attack re
-(Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives): suppose that for any given A, B ∈ AR, and two n-tuples of attack relations,
. Without loss of generality assume that |{i : 
PROOF
Suppose that → F has a cycle of attacks, say
A 0 → F A 1 → F . . . → F A k → F A 0 . By definition of qualified voting, for j = 0 . . . k − 1 A j → F A j+1 if and only if U ⊆ {i : A j → i A j+1 }. By the same token, A k → F A 0 iff U ⊆ {i : A k → i A 0 }.
That is, for each
i ∈ U , A 0 → i A 1 → i . . . → i A k → i A 0 .
But this contradicts that each individual attack relation is acyclic. 2 4 Decisive Sets of Attack Relations
The aggregation function determines a class of decisive sets (i.e., winning coalitions) of attack relations. Interestingly, the structure of this class exhibits (in relevant cases) clear algebraic features that shed light on the behavior of the aggregation function. Formally: Ω ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be a decisive set if for every possible n-tuple (→ 1 , . . . , → n ) and every
As we have already seen in the case of qualified voting aggregation functions, if not every member of a decisive set agrees with the others over a pair of arguments, the aggregate attack relation should not include the pair. But this is so unless any other decisive set can force the pair of arguments into the aggregate attack relation. 6 Example 4. In Example 1, each of {1, 2}, {2, 3} is a decisive set, since they include more than half of the agents that coincide with pairs of attacks in the aggregate attack relation. On the other hand, for the qualified voting function of Example 3, U = {2, 3} is decisive, but not {1, 2} or {1, 3}.
If we recall that the U is a decisive set for qualified voting, we can conjecture that there might exist a close relation between the characterization of an aggregation function and the class of its decision sets. Furthermore, if a function verifies Arrow's axioms and yields an acyclic attack relation up from acyclic individual attack relations, it can be completely characterized in terms of the class of its decision sets:
Proposition 3
Consider an aggregate attack relation F that for every n-tuple (→ 
-No O ∈Ω is such that |O| = 1.
6 Of course, in a qualified voting function U is always a decisive set. WhenΩ satisfies the properties described in Proposition 3, we say thatΩ is a proper prefilter over {1, . . . , n} [7] . Moreover, if the class of decision sets for an aggregation function has this structure, it aggregates acyclic attack relations into an acyclic relation, verifying Arrow's conditions.
PROOF
O ∩ W = ∅. Suppose furthermore that O determines → F up from {→ i } n i=1 while W defines → F up from {→ i } n i=1 . Then, if over A, B → i =→ i then → F = → F over A,-A 1 → 1 A 2 . . . → 1 A n , -A 2 → 2 . . .A n → 2 A 1 , -. . ., -A n → n A 1 . . . → n A n−1 .
Then, over each pair
, for short), the only possible proper prefilters are:
Notice that the corresponding aggregation functions F I , F II and F III are qualified voting functions. To see how the other three functions act, just consider
-A → F C since while there is no agreement in {1, 2}, {2, 3} agree in that A attacks C.
That means that F
IV behaves in the same manner as a majority function over the following profile: (→ 1 , → 2 , → 3 ). The same conclusion can be drawn for F V and F V I .
Notice that, F IV is actually a majority function only in the case that → F is acyclic. That is, it behaves like the majority function in well-behaved cases. Instead, for the individual attack relations in Example 2 it yields an acyclic order A → F C → F B, which is not the outcome of the majority function. Therefore, we should actually say that F IV , F V and F V I are acyclic majority functions. Notice that anyī ∈ ∩Ω is kind of a "hidden dictator", in the sense made precise in the following result:
Proposition 4
Ifī ∈ ∩Ω, and FΩ is the aggregation function characterized by the prefilter then Ω, → FΩ ⊆→ī. A, B ∈ AR, we have, without loss of generality, that A over (A, B) . 2
PROOF
Suppose that given
We will consider now the question of Aggregation and Cycles of Attack. The analysis of argumentation systems is usually carried out in terms of their extensions. The existence and properties of the extensions can be ascertained according to the properties of the attack relation. In the case that several alternative attack relations compete over the same class of arguments, the class of extensions may vary from one to another. The structure of extensions of such an argumentation system should not be seen as just the enumeration of the classes corresponding to each attack relation but should arise from the same aggregation process we have discussed previously. That is, it should follow from the properties of the aggregate attack relation. In particular, since our main results concern the aggregation of acyclic attack relations into an acyclic aggregate one, we will focus on the case of well-founded argumentation frameworks (cf. [3] , p. 10). We can say, roughly, that their main feature is the absence of cycles of attack among their arguments. For them, all the types of extensions described by Dung coincide. Furthermore, they all yield a single set of arguments (cf. [3] , theorem 30, p. 331). To see how such a single extension of an argument system over a family of individual attack relations may obtain, let us recall that if for each i, → i has no cycles of attack, an aggregate relation → FΩ , obtained through an aggregation function F with a prefilter of decisive setsΩ, is acyclic as well. The following result is an immediate consequence of this claim.
Proposition 5
Consider an aggregate argument framework AF * = AR; 
Discussion
As indicated by Brown in [11] , the fact that the class of decisive sets constitutes a prefilter is an indication of the existence of a collegium. In SCT this means a kind of "shadow" decisive set, being its members interspersed among all the actual decisive sets. Their actual power comes not from being able to enforce outcomes but from their ability to veto alternatives that are not desirable for them. In the current application, the existence of a collegium means that there exists a class of attack relations that by themselves cannot determine the resulting attack relation, but can instead block (veto) alternatives. This feature still leaves many possibilities open, but as our examples intended to show, there are few aggregation functions that may adopt this form, while at the same time verifying the conditions postulated by Arrow for fair aggregation functions. The main instance is constituted by the acyclic majority function, but qualified voting functions yield also fair outcomes. The difference is that with the acyclic majority functions one of the several attack relations in AF n is selected, while with qualified voting functions, new attack relations may arise. But these new attack relations just combine those of the winning coalitions, and therefore can be seen as resulting from the application of generalized variants of the majority function. That is, if two or more rules belong to all the decisive sets, their common fragments plus the non-conflicting ones add up to constitute the aggregate attack relation. In a way or another, the attack relations that are always decisive end up acting as hidden dictators in the aggregation process.
Explicit dictators arise in aggregation processes in other branches of non-monotonic reasoning. Doyle and Wellman [12] , in particular, suggested to translate Reiter's defaults into total preorders of autoepistemic formulas, representing preferences over worlds. Reasoning with different defaults implies to find, first, the aggregation of the different preorders. These authors show that it is an immediate consequence of Arrow's theorem that no aggregation function can fulfill all the properties that characterize fairness (i.e., the equivalents of the Pareto condition, Positive Responsiveness, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Non-Dictatorship). In terms of decisive sets, it means thatΩ constitutes a principal ultrafilter. 7 Since the number of defaults is assumed to be finite, it follows that there exists one of these default rules, say R * that belongs to each U ∈Ω. Of course, the existence of R * violates the Non-Dictatorship condition, and consequently the actual class of formulas that arise in the aggregation are determined by R * . It can be said that Doyle and Wellman's analysis is concerned with the generation of a class of arguments arising from different default rules while we, instead, concentrate on the comparison among arguments in an abstract argumentation framework. But Dung [3] has shown that Reiter's system can be rewritten as an argumentation framework, and therefore both approaches can be made compatible. In this sense, Doyle and Wellman's result can be now interpreted as indicating thatΩ (over attack relations) is not a proper prefilter over {1, . . . , n} (where these indexes range over the attack relations determined each by a corresponding default rule). Instead, as said, it constitutes a principal ultrafilter and therefore it implies the existence of a "dictatorial" attack relation, that is imposed over the framework.
Finally, the approach most related to ours is Coste-Marquis et al. [4] , which already presented some early ideas on how to merge Dung's argumentation frameworks. The authors' aim is to find a set of arguments collectively warranted, addressing two main problems. One is the individual problem faced by each agent while considering a set of arguments different to that of other agents. The other is the aggregate problem of getting the collectively supported extension. The second one is the most clearly related to our approach, but differs in that the authors postulate a specific way of merging the individual frameworks.
The approach is based on a notion of distance between partial argumentation frameworks (PAFs, each one representing one agent's criterion) over a common set of arguments A. Each partial argumentation framework is defined by three binary relations R, I and N over A: R is the attack relation sanctioned by the agent, I includes the pairs of arguments about which the agent cannot establish any attacks, and N = (A×A)\R∪I. , z) ). These mappings give a way of measuring how "close" is a collective framework from a given profile.
In a further step the authors define an aggregation function as a mapping from (R+)
, and identity (⊗(x) = x). The idea is that merging a profile of AF s is a two-step process: first, to compute an expansion of each AF i over the profile; and second, a fusion in which the AF s over A that are selected as result of the merging are the ones that are the "closest" to the profile. We are currently trying to establish a formal relation between this approach and our results about decisive sets of agents, in particular to determine whether Coste-Marquis et al.'s aggregation procedure satisfies the Arrovian properties.
Further Work
A relevant question arises from our analysis of the semantics of aggregate frameworks when the attack relations are acyclic. Namely, whether there exist a sensible notion of aggregation of extensions that could correspond to the aggregation of attack criteria. In this paper we have focused on the path that goes from several attack relations to a single aggregate one and from it to its corresponding extension. An open question is whether it is possible to go through the alternative path from several attack relations to their corresponding extensions and from there on to a single family of extensions. If, furthermore, these two alternative paths commute (in categorytheoretic terms), the aggregation of attack relations would be preferable in applications since it is simpler to aggregate orderings than families of sets.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to be pessimistic, due to the similarities between this problem and the aggregation of judgments for which List and Pettit have found negative results [13] . They consider the so-called "discursive dilemma" in which several judgments (i.e., pairs of the form premises, conclusion ), are aggregated componentwise, that is, a pair formed by an aggregated premises set and an aggregated conclusion is obtained, but it does not constitute an acceptable judgment. It could happen that similar problems may arise while trying to match aggregated attack criteria and aggregated extensions.
Pigozzi [14] postulates a solution to the discursive dilemma based on the use of operators for merging belief bases in AI [15] . To pose a merge operation as an aggregation one involves to incorporate a series of trade-offs among the several alternatives that hardly will respect Arrow's conditions, as it is well known in the literature on political systems (see [16] ). In relation to this issue, a wider point that we plan to address is to systematize the non-fair aggregation procedures that could be applied to the aggregation of attack relations in argument frameworks. The idea would be to lesser the demands on the aggregation function and to see which features arise in the aggregate. It seems sensible to think that depending on the goals of the aggregation process, one or another function should be chosen.
Another question to investigate is the connections between the correspondence of the aggregate attack relation among arguments and the relation of dominance among alternatives ( [17] ). From a SCT view, alternative A dominates alternative B iff the number of individuals for which A is preferred to B is larger than the number of individuals for which B is preferred to A. This implies that the dominance relation is asymmetric. Although it is not commonly assumed in the literature that attack relations are asymmetric, it follows from our definition of majority voting over pairs of arguments that the resulting attack relations will have this property (even when cycles of order > 2 may occur). Dominance relations lead to the choice of stable sets. A stable set is such that none of its elements dominate another, and every alternative outside the set is dominated by some of its elements. The correspondence between stable semantics in argumentation frameworks and stable sets was previously studied by Dung ([3] ). It is natural, so, to inquire about the relationship between our majoritarian voting aggregation mechanism on attack relations and stable sets in argumentation frameworks.
